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Abstract—In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), authentica-
tion is a crucial security requirement to avoid attacks against
secure communication, and to mitigate DoS attacks exploiting
the limited resources of sensor nodes. Resource constraints
of sensor nodes are hurdles in applying strong public key
cryptographic based mechanisms in WSNs. To address the
problem of authentication in WSNs, we propose an efficient
and secure framework for authenticated broadcast/multicast
by sensor nodes as well as for outside user authentication,
which utilizes identity based cryptography and online/offline
signature schemes. The primary goals of this framework are
to enable all sensor nodes in the network, firstly, to broadcast
and/or multicast an authenticated message quickly; secondly, to
verify the broadcast/multicast message sender and the message
contents; and finally, to verify the legitimacy of an outside
user. The proposed framework is also evaluated using the most
efficient and secure identity-based signature schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Low cost and immunity from cabling have become strong
motivations for many applications of Wireless Sensor Net-
works (WSNs) like environmental monitoring, disaster han-
dling, traffic control and various military applications [1],
[8]. In these applications, sensor devices sense or monitor
physical and environmental changes like temperature, pres-
sure, etc. and communicate this data to other nodes over a
wireless network. Authentication of this data as well as of
the data source is critical, as the data may ultimately be used
to assist in some significant situations. In some applications,
there are also outside users of the sensor network who are
interested in the data collected by the sensor nodes. User
authentication is equally important as data collected by the
sensor nodes may be confidential, or in some situations only
the subscribed users are allowed to access it.
However, the radio links are insecure, facilitating an ad-
versary in intercepting, injecting or modifying communica-
tion. Resource limitations of sensor nodes make it difficult to
apply strong traditional cryptographic mechanisms to secure
the communication. Moreover, WSNs are often deployed in
a hostile environment where they are physically accessible
by an adversary who can discover cryptographic material
e.g., keys, stored on the sensor nodes. In this scenario, it is
challenging to enable sensor nodes to accept communication
only from the legitimate entities and to distinguish between
valid and fake or modified communication.
In this paper, we address the problem of authentication
in WSNs, particularly authenticated broadcast/multicast by
sensor nodes and outside user authentication. The problem
of authenticated broadcast/multicast by sensor nodes is not
addressed by the existing authentication schemes for WSNs.
Symmetric schemes like μTESLA [21] and its variations
[11], [17], [18] proposed for base station broadcast authen-
tication use Message Authentication Code (MAC) and are
efficient in terms of processing and energy consumption.
However, they suffer from the following issues:
• Provide delayed authentication.
• Very slow for large scale sensor networks.
• DoS attack against storage due to late authentication.
• Not scalable in terms of number of senders.
• Multiple senders cannot broadcast simultaneously.
• If a sensor node wants to broadcast a message, it
unicasts the message to the base station, which then
broadcasts that message on behalf of that node.
An extension of μTESLA [7], [15] attempts to enable sensor
nodes to broadcast messages to nearby sensor nodes only,
however, it inherits the weaknesses of μTESLA. Asymmet-
ric schemes, for example digital signatures, overcome the
problems of symmetric schemes but require public keys and
certificates on the receiver side to verify signed messages.
Moreover, it is more time and power consuming for sensor
nodes to sign a message than to compute a MAC. Digital
signature based authentication schemes discussed in [6],
[23], [24] allow broadcast by powerful senders only and
therefore, are not suitable for resource constrained motes.
In outside user authentication, the number of outside users
of sensor nodes data is also restricted due to the fact that
sensor nodes need some user specific information to verify a
user request. For example, RRUASN [4] requires the public
key and certificate of a user on the receiver side, which
are sent with every user request (increasing transmission
overhead). DP2AC [32] uses a token to authenticate a user
and stores every used token to control re-usability.
To handle the above mentioned issues, we propose an
authentication framework for WSNs, using Identity-based
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Cryptography and Online/Offline Signature (OOS) schemes,
comprised of two authentication schemes; one for quick
authenticated broadcast/multicast by sensor nodes and an-
other for outside user authentication. The first scheme
allows every sensor node in the network to broadcast or
multicast authenticated messages very quickly without the
involvement of the base station. All potential receivers can
verify a message sent by any sender node in the network.
It also allows sensor nodes on the path from the sender
node to the receivers to verify a valid message and drop
false injected data. The second scheme enables all sensor
nodes in the network to verify the legitimacy of any outside
user without storing user specific information. It allows a
maximum possible number of legitimate users to access
data from sensor nodes in a secure way. This scheme first
authenticates a user and then establishes a session key for
secure exchange of user queries and sensor nodes data.
The proposed framework uses Identity-based On-
line/Offline Signature (IBOOS) scheme (an ID-based version
of OOS) for the first scheme and Identity-based Signature
(IBS) scheme for the second scheme. IBS schemes [26]
allow a user to use his identity information such as name,
email address etc., which is unique to him, as his public key
while the corresponding private key is generated by a private
key generator (PKG). It eliminates the need of a certificate
signed by a certification authority to extract the public key
for the verification of a signed message. A message signed
with a user’s private key can be verified using his ID.
Online/Offline Signature (OOS) schemes [12] divide the
process of message signing into two phases, the Offline
phase and the Online phase. The Offline phase is performed
before the message to be signed becomes available. This
phase performs the most computations of signature gener-
ation and results in a partial signature. Once the message
is known, the Online phase starts. This phase retrieves the
partial signature calculated during the Offline phase and
performs some minor quick computations to obtain the final
signature. The Online phase is assumed to be very fast,
consisting of small computations while the Offline phase can
be performed by other resourceful device. OOS enables a
resource constrained sensor node to sign a message quickly,
once it has some critical event to report. IBOOS is the
ID-based version of OOS, where a message signed with a
signer’s private key is verified using signer’s ID.
The primary objective of this framework is to design
an authentication mechanism which solves the above men-
tioned authentication problems efficiently in terms of power
consumption, processing time and storage overhead. The
primary advantage of this research work is that it does not
restrict the solution to the existing IBS and IBOOS schemes,
rather it provides a general authentication framework which
can be reused with new IBS and IBOOS schemes. Once new
IBS and IBOOS schemes are available, which are more se-
cure and efficient than the existing IBS and IBOOS schemes,
they replace the existing ones to achieve better results.
Security and performance of the proposed framework are
also evaluated and compared with some existing signature
based authentication schemes for WSNs. This paper makes
the following main contributions:
• Points out the need of quick authenticated broadcast
and/or multicast by all sensor nodes in the network and
proposes a secure and efficient solution to this problem
without the involvement of the base station. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to highlight
and handle this problem;
• Proposes the use of online/offline signature schemes for
sensor broadcast. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first application of online/offline signatures in
WSNs;
• Provides a secure and efficient identity-based authenti-
cation framework which can also utilize new IBS and
IBOOS schemes to achieve improved performance.
Organization: Section 2 discusses motivations, section 3
introduces the cryptographic primitives, section 4 presents
our proposed framework, section 5 evaluates its security &
performance and section 6 concludes the paper.
II. AUTHENTICATION IN WSN
Authentication in WSNs can be divided into three cate-
gories, namely base station to sensor nodes, sensor nodes
to other sensor nodes, and outside users to sensor nodes.
The problem of authenticated broadcast by the base sta-
tion has been widely addressed [6], [11], [17], [18], [21].
We focus on the other two categories, i.e., authenticated
broadcast/multicast by the sensor nodes and outside user
authentication.
A. Authenticated Broadcast/Multicast by Sensor Nodes
There are many critical situations where a sensor node
requires to send a quick message. For example:
• In a forest fire alarm application [27], sensor nodes
deployed in a forest should immediately inform author-
ities about the event and the exact location of the event
before the fire spreads uncontrollably.
• In a traffic application [5], whenever a sensor node
senses an accident (or a traffic jam) on the road it sends
an immediate message in all directions to alert other
traffic approaching this location.
• Consider the military application scenario discussed in
[27], where a troop of soldiers needs to move through
a battlefield. Sensor nodes deployed there detect the
presence of the enemy and broadcast this information
immediately throughout the network. Soldiers, passing
near these sensor nodes, use this information to strate-
gically position themselves in the battlefield.
All these scenarios require a message to be sent as quickly
as possible. Due to wireless media, transmission and recep-
tion of a message consume considerable time. Moreover,
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in most cases a message propagates through several hops
to reach the desired destinations. Therefore, the signature
generation and the verification times should be as small as
possible. A delayed message may have undesirable effects.
For example, it may help a fire spreading uncontrollably and
a traffic jam becoming worse. A delayed message about the
presence of an enemy in the battlefield may cause the deaths
of soldiers while moving through the battlefield. In all the
above situations, message authentication is equally important
otherwise a malicious entity may exploit its absence. For
example, an adversary may send fake messages to block
traffic towards a specific region or to turn traffic towards a
specific direction. In battlefield, sensor nodes added by the
enemy can disseminate wrong information about enemy’s
movement, thus deceiving soldiers.
Moreover, in all the above mentioned scenarios, sensor
nodes on the path from the sender node to the receiver(s)
relay the messages towards destination. Wireless communi-
cation allowing an adversary to inject false messages during
multi hop forwarding [19] causes sensor nodes to relay
false data and deplete their energy. Hence, sensor nodes
on the path should be able to authenticate and filter out
false messages as early as possible to save relaying energy
[33], [34]. Therefore, they are also potential receivers of
these messages, arising the need of authenticated multicast
by sensor nodes. In battlefield application, all sensor nodes
in the network are potential receivers of critical information,
arising the need of authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes.
To summarize, all these scenarios require a secure mech-
anism which, on one hand, enables all sensor nodes in the
network to send an immediate authenticated message to
report a critical situation, and on the other hand, enables
every receiver to verify this message. For simplicity, both
broadcast and multicast are referred as broadcast in the rest
of this paper.
B. User Authentication
Sensor nodes data may be confidential and in some
situations only the subscribed users, who have paid, are
allowed to obtain this data. A user authentication mechanism
aims to prevent unauthorized users to access data from
sensor nodes. Usually, a mechanism to provide an outside
user access to sensor nodes data requires three tasks:
1) User Authentication allows only legitimate users of
the data to access it.
2) Access Control allows a user to access only the data
which he is entitled to access.
3) Session Key Establishment enables secure exchange of
user queries and confidential data between users and
sensor nodes.
In centralized user authentication, all users are authenti-
cated through the base station. This mechanism is easy to
deploy because the base station is a powerful device which
can perform complex cryptographic operations. However,
this approach has a few drawbacks. Firstly, it makes the
base station a single point of failure. Secondly, it causes
sensor nodes near the base station to deplete their energy
quickly as for every user request, they relay packets be-
tween base station and queried sensor nodes. Furthermore,
it causes a severe DoS attack where an adversary sends fake
request messages causing sensor nodes to relay them towards
the base station for verification, increasing network traffic
and depleting their energy. User authentication schemes
discussed in [10], [16], [29], [30] all suffer from these
problems. To avoid this kind of DoS attack, a user should
be locally authenticated by the sensor nodes without the
involvement of a third entity, i.e., a distributed approach.
This approach reduces traffic congestion and transmission
overhead within the network. However, it puts the burden
of authentication on sensor nodes. As sensor nodes are
resource constrained devices as compared to the base station,
a lightweight user authentication mechanism is needed for
sensor nodes to verify authenticity of the users.
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
A. ID-based Signature (IBS)
Definition 1. An ID-based signature (IBS) scheme consists
of four algorithms as follows:
1) System Setup (SS): Given a security parameter 1k,
outputs a master secret key SKPKG and system param-
eters SP.
2) Key Extraction (KE): Given a user’s identity IDi
and master secret key SKPKG, outputs a corresponding
private key DIDi , i.e., DIDi ← KE(IDi, SKPKG).
3) Signature Generation (Sign): Given a message m and
a signing key DIDi , outputs a signature σ , i.e., σ ←
Sign(m, DIDi ).
4) Signature Verification (Ver): Given a message m,
user’s identity IDi, a signature σ and system parame-
ters SP, returns 1 if the signature is valid or 0 if not.
Namely, 0/1←Ver(m, IDi,σ ,SP).
B. ID-based Online/Offline Signature (IBOOS)
Definition 2. An ID-based online/offline signature (IBOOS)
scheme consists of five algorithms as follows:
1) System Setup (SS): Same as in Definition 1.
2) Key Extraction (KE): Same as in Definition 1.
3) Offline Signing (OffSign): Given a signing key DIDi
and system parameters SP, outputs an offline signature
S, i.e., S← O f f Sign(DIDi ,SP).
4) Online Signing (OnSign): Given a message m and an
offline signature S, outputs an online signature σ , i.e.,
σ ← OnSign(m,S).
5) Signature Verification (Ver): Given a message m,
user’s identity IDi, signature σ and system parameters
SP, returns 1 if the signature is valid and 0 if not.
Namely, 0/1←Ver(m, IDi,σ ,SP).
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IV. THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present the proposed authentica-
tion framework which is composed of two authentication
schemes. The first two phases of both schemes i.e., the
System Initialization and the Key Generation are performed
once, before the deployment of the WSN.
A. Authenticated Broadcast by Sensor Nodes
For authenticated broadcast, a message is signed using
IBOOS. Some IBOOS schemes [25] allow reuse of a partial
signature computed in the offline phase to sign more than
one message, which decreases energy consumption. More-
over, OOS allows the offline phase to be performed on some
other resourceful device. Hence, it is possible for the base
station to perform the complex computations of the offline
phase and distribute the partial signature to the sensor nodes.
The sensor nodes then only perform small, energy efficient
computations of the online phase.
System Initialization: In our scheme, the base station
plays the role of PKG, a trustworthy entity, and initializes
the system in this phase. Let SKBS be the secret key of the
base station. The base station computes the corresponding
public key PKBS and sets up the public system parameters
SP which include PKBS. The master secret key SKBS is only
kept by the base station while SP is made public.
Key Generation: In this phase, the base station computes
the secret keys of all sensor nodes corresponding to their
IDs using the master secret key SKBS. For a sensor node
i with identity IDi, the corresponding secret key is DIDi
computed as DIDi ← KE(IDi,SKBS). IDs, corresponding
private keys and system parameters are stored on sensor
nodes before deployment. Hence, every sensor node i stores
{IDi,DIDi ,SP}.
Message Broadcast and Authentication: In this phase,
the sensor nodes broadcast authenticated messages which
are verified using their IDs. The signature generation of a
broadcast message is divided into two phases:
Offline phase: The offline phase is performed by the base
station, before the message to broadcast becomes available.
The offline signature algorithm runs in this phase on the base
station, and performs the most signature computations to
calculate the partial signature S as S← O f f Sign(DIDi ,SP).
The resulting partial signature S is stored on sensor node i.
Online phase: Whenever a sensor node i senses an event
which requires quick reporting, the online phase starts. In
this phase, the sensor node i retrieves the partial signature
S calculated during the offline phase. The online signature
algorithm runs in this phase on sensor node i, and performs
very minor and fast computations to obtain the final signa-
ture σ over message m as σ←OnSign(m,T S, IDi,S), where
T S is the current time stamp. The final broadcast message
then contains the message m, time stamp T S, identity of the
sensor node IDi and the signature σ i.e., {m,T S, IDi,σ}.
Authentication: On receiving a broadcast message, re-
ceiver first checks the time stamp T S to avoid the verification
of a replayed message. If it is a fresh one, the receiver further
proceeds with signature verification; otherwise it discards
the message. The receiver verifies the signature σ using
sender node’s identity IDi and other system parameters as
0/1←Ver(m,T S, IDi,σ ,SP).
If the verification succeeds, the receiver accepts the mes-
sage; otherwise it discards it. If necessary, it rebroadcasts
the message to sensor nodes belonging to the next hop.
Sender Revocation: To revoke a compromised sensor
node i, the base station broadcasts its identity IDi to all
other sensor nodes in the network, who store IDi. If in the
future a sensor node receives a message containing IDi, it
simply rejects the message without going through authen-
tication process. An adversary is assumed to compromise
only a few sensor nodes in the network. If the adversary
compromises majority of the sensor nodes, it will break
down all the security mechanisms. Therefore, storing the IDs
of few compromised nodes would incur a reasonable storage
overhead for sensor nodes. Moreover, the base station can
periodically update system parameters and secret keys of all
legitimate sensor nodes excluding malicious nodes. How-
ever, this update might be costly. Another possible solution
is to manually detach these compromised sensor nodes from
the sensor network.
B. User Authentication
In order to access data from sensor nodes, a user first
registers himself to the base station and obtains his private
key and other system parameters. After that, whenever he
wants to access data, he sends a signed request to the
sensor nodes in his range who verify his signed request
locally using his ID. If the verification succeeds, the sensor
nodes and the user both compute a session key for further
communication. This session key establishment enables the
user to send encrypted queries to the sensor nodes and get
confidential data from them.
System Initialization and Key Generation phases are the
same as described in the first scheme.
User Registration: This phase is performed whenever a
new user is added to the system. In this phase, a user U
with identity IDU registers with the system. The base station
computes his private key DIDU as DIDU ← KE(IDU ,SKBS).
The user gets his private key and other system parameters
from the base station through a secure channel. Hence, every
user gets {IDU ,DIDU ,SP}.
User Authentication: In order to query sensor nodes,
a user U sends his signed request to the sensor nodes in
his range. Let N be the number of sensor nodes in his
range. U’s request contains his request message RM, current
time stamp T S, identity IDU , and the signature σ calculated
on these parameters using his secret key i.e., U → N:
{RM,T S, IDU ,σ}, where σ = Sign((RM,T S, IDU ),DIDU ).
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On receiving a user request, each sensor node first checks
the time stamp T S to filter out a replayed request message.
If it is a fresh one, sensor node verifies the signature
using U’s ID and other system parameters stored on it as
0/1←Ver(RM,T S, IDU ,σ ,SP). If the verification succeeds,
it proceeds with session key establishment else it stops
further computation and communication.
Session Key Establishment: To provide secure trans-
mission of data from sensor nodes to user, a session key
needs to be established. For this purpose, any secure key
exchange protocol could be used here. However, an identity
based one-pass key establishment protocol is an attractive
choice for resource constrained sensor nodes. It reduces the
number of messages exchanged during key establishment
phase i.e., only one party computes and sends its ephemeral
key to the other party, for example, identity based one-pass
key establishment protocol presented in [13]. That single
message can be combined with user request message (in
user authentication phase) which is signed by the user. It
further reduces the communication. It also avoids the man-
in-the-middle attack. The only message exchanged between
the user U and the sensor node A for key establishment will
be signed by U and verified by A, which makes it difficult
for an intruder to send fake ephemeral key to the sensor
nodes on behalf of U .
To establish a session key, U randomly computes its
ephemeral key R. U then sends R, together with his signa-
ture, to A in authentication phase. If U’s signature is valid
and user authentication succeeds, both A and U compute
session key SK using the key derivation function χ as
SK = χ(IDA||IDU ||T S||TAU ), where T S is the time stamp
to avoid replayed messages and TAU is a common secret
computed by both parties using R and their secret keys as
described in [13]. At this point, the session key SK is ready
for encrypting data.
User Revocation: User revocation can be divided into
two cases; firstly, to revoke a user whose access time period
has been expired, and secondly, to revoke a malicious user.
These two cases can be treated differently. To handle the first
case, at the time when base station calculates the secret key
for a user U , the expiry time ET of the user can be used as
a parameter to calculate the secret key. After his access time
period expires, his secret key will automatically expire. If
he now sends a signed request, it will not pass verification.
In the second case, the base station issues an authenticated
revocation list containing malicious user’s ID. Sensor nodes
store it until the malicious user’s expiry time is passed.
Thus, if next time that user attempts to access data from
sensor nodes, the sensor nodes reject his request without
going through authentication process. After his access time
expiration, his secret key will expire and he will not be
able to successfully authenticate himself to the system. In
WSN, the case of the malicious users is not very common.
Therefore, storing IDs of malicious users until their expiry
time will not impose an unreasonable storage overhead on
sensor nodes. To efficiently handle storage, user’s access
period can be kept short so that sensor nodes do not store
malicious users’ IDs for a long time. After that time period
only the private keys of the legitimate users are updated for
next time period. The duration of this period depends on
how frequently the event of the malicious users occur.
Although some figures would help to improve the read-
ability of framework, space limitation does not allow it.
C. Instantiation of the Proposed Framework
There are many IBS and IBOOS schemes available, for
example, based on ECC and RSA signatures. Verifying RSA
signature is efficient for sensor nodes [14] since we can
set small verification exponents. This fact can be utilized in
user authentication scheme, where sensor nodes only verify
a signed user request. However, RSA based signatures are
large, resulting in a considerably increased message size.
ECC based signatures are equally useful for signing and
verification of messages and have short signature sizes.
Therefore, for WSN, ECC based signatures are considered
more efficient than RSA signatures. To instantiate the pro-
posed authentication framework, we have selected the most
secure and efficient ECC based signature schemes from the
available IBS and IBOOS schemes. Keeping in mind the
security and efficiency requirements, an IBS scheme given
in [6] is selected for user authentication scheme while two
different IBOOS schemes given in [25] and [31] are selected
to evaluate sensor broadcast scheme.
ID-based Signature (IBS) Schemes: ID-based signature
schemes are suitable for the proposed user authentication
scheme. IBS scheme in [6] presents an ID-based signature
which is actually an improvement over BNN-IBS [2] to
reduce the signature size. Security of this signature scheme
depends on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem.
ID-based Online/Offline Signature (IBOOS) Schemes:
ID-based online/offline signature schemes are suitable for
the proposed sensor broadcast authentication scheme. An
IBOOS scheme in [25] presents a method to convert any
underlying signature scheme into an online/offline signa-
ture scheme. The Offline signature in this scheme can
be securely reused to sign more than one message. This
signature scheme is proved to be existentially unforgeable.
Its security depends on Discrete Logarithm Problem. Un-
like [25], an IBOOS scheme presented in [31] provides
a direct online/offline signature scheme, which does not
require another underlying signature scheme. This signature
scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen
message attacks.
V. EVALUATION
A. Security Analysis
This section analyses the security achieved by the pro-
posed authentication framework.
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Authentication: Authentication is achieved as only the
legitimate broadcast senders and the outside users with valid
secret keys can sign a message.
Verification: Every sensor node can verify a broadcast
message by any sender and authenticity of any outside user.
Integrity: Provides message integrity as any changes
made in the contents of the messages during transmission
are detected through signature verification.
Freshness: Replayed data can be distinguished through
timestamp, providing freshness of data.
Session Key: After successful user authentication, session
key establishes a secure communication between the user
and the sensor nodes.
Now we consider some usual security threats and show
how our proposed framework counters them:
1) Active attack: The proposed framework employs se-
cure digital signature schemes providing strong au-
thentication and message integrity, and making it
impossible for an intruder to sign or modify a valid
message sent by another legitimate sender. Time stamp
prevents replay of a broadcast message or a previous
successful authentication message by a valid user.
2) DoS attack: The proposed sensor broadcast scheme
provides authentication without any delay. Hence, it
prevents DoS attack faced in μTESLA. In user authen-
tication scheme, a user is locally authenticated by the
sensor nodes, and not by the base station, which avoids
the DoS attack caused by fake intruder’s requests.
3) Node Compromise Attack: In symmetric key schemes,
where a single key or a subset of keys are used by
more than one sensor node to calculate a MAC for
a message, a compromise of a single node enables
an intruder to impersonate all sensor nodes sharing
that MAC key(s). In our scheme, an intruder can only
impersonate the compromised node. Furthermore, with
revocation process he will not be able to successfully
broadcast further messages in the network.
4) False Data Injection Attack: The proposed sensor
broadcast scheme enables all sensor nodes on the
message path, during multi-hop forwarding, to verify
and filter out false injected data earlier.
B. Performance Analysis
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed
authentication framework.
Broadcast by Sensor Nodes: Unlike μTESLA, in our
proposed sensor broadcast scheme, a sensor node can broad-
cast a message itself without the involvement of base station.
Quick Broadcast: An online/offline signature scheme
performs the most time consuming offline phase of message
generation beforehand. It enables sensor nodes to sign and
broadcast a message quickly once the message is known.
Storage Efficiency: As sensor nodes do not store IDs
and corresponding public keys of all broadcast senders and
outside users for verification, it provides storage efficiency.
Computation Efficiency: In sensor broadcast, by per-
forming the offline phase on base station, the sensor nodes
are only left with the online phase computation which is
very efficient in terms of time and energy consumption.
Communication Efficiency: ID-based schemes do not
require a broadcast sender or an outside user to send public
keys/certificates with all messages, thus reducing communi-
cation overhead.
Multiple Senders: ID-based signatures handle public
keys/certificates issue. Therefore, the proposed framework
allows multiple broadcast senders and outside users.
Scalability: New sensor nodes and outside users can be
added to the WSN easily at any time. Preloaded with ID,
secret key and public parameters, new sensor nodes can
broadcast messages as well as verify messages by any other
broadcast sender. New users simply need to register them-
selves to the base station and get their secret information
corresponding to their IDs.
C. Discussion
This section gives a rough-and-ready estimation of apply-
ing our proposed authentication schemes on sensor nodes
and comparison with other existing digital signature based
authentication schemes for WSN. We assume the capabilities
of standard MICA2 mote [9], a popular choice among
research community. Figures in Table 1 and Table 2 are
computed considering only the expensive operations of
pairing, point multiplication, exponentiation and ECDSA
& RSA signature costs, based on the actual experimental
results of these operations for MICA2 given in [14], [22] and
[28]. A point multiplication operation on MICA2 takes 0.81s
[14]. For MICA2, active power consumption is 30mW [22].
Therefore, computation of one point multiplication operation
consumes 0.81*30 = 24.3mWs. According to [28], comput-
ing a pairing operation on MICA2 takes 2.66s and consumes
62.73mWs. Signing and verifying an ECDSA takes 0.89s
and 1.77s and consumes 26.96mWs and 53.42mWs, respec-
tively [22]. One RSA signature verification with 1024 bit
key size takes 0.47s and consumes 14.05mWs [22].
For broadcast authentication schemes, we only consider
computation cost and message size. Transmission cost is pro-
portional to the message size. Assuming number of sensor
nodes N = 65,000, message m = 20 bytes, timestamp T S =
2 bytes and ID = 2 bytes, Table 1 gives a comparison with
existing signature based schemes. Existing authentication
schemes assume broadcast senders as powerful devices,
however for comparison purposes, we estimate the cost
of applying these schemes to ordinary sensor nodes. CAS
and DAS in [24] propose ECDSA to sign a message.
CAS requires signer’s public key and certificate to be sent
with every message, increasing message size. The receiver
verifies two ECDSA signatures for every message; one to
verify certificate and other to verify message. DAS requires
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Table I
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED BROADCAST AUTHENTICATION SCHEME WITH EXISTING BROADCAST AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES.
Schemes
Signature
Scheme
Energy Cost
(Offline) mWs
Energy Cost
(Online) mWs
Computation Time
(Online) s
Storage Overhead
(KB)
Message Size
(bytes)
Existing Broadcast Authentication Schemes
CAS [24] ECDSA 0 26.96 0.89 0 148
DAS [24] ECDSA 0 26.96 0.89 (0.022N =) 1441 84
IDS [23] Pairing based 0 87.09 3.47 0 108 [24]
IMBAS [6] BNN [2] 0 72.90 2.43 0 107
Proposed Broadcast Authentication Scheme
Proposed IBOOS [25] τ* 5.62 0.19 0 64 + ρ*
Proposed IBOOS [31] 48.60 ε* ε* 0 84
τ* and ρ* show the computational cost and the signature size of underlying signature scheme respectively and ε* shows negligible cost
all sensor nodes to store public keys of all senders. For N
= 65,000, public key size = 22 bytes, every sensor node
is required to store 1441KB which is beyond the storage
capabilities of sensor nodes. Signature generation in IDS
[23] comprises one pairing and one point multiplication
while in IMBAS [6] three point multiplications as expensive
operations.
The proposed broadcast authentication scheme using first
IBOOS [25] allows the secure reuse of offline signature,
computed on base station. The only cost a sensor node bears
in message signing is the cost of the online phase which
is two scalar exponentiations in group G. Computing one
scalar exponentiation (of the form Bt ) in G requires roughly
t squaring and t/2 multiplications in G (Chap 14, Algorithm
14.79, [20]), where t is the bit length of exponent. For
simplicity, we assume computing one squaring is equivalent
to one multiplication (squaring can be almost twice as fast as
multiplying distinct elements [20]). For t = 160, one expo-
nentiation requires 240 multiplications. One multiplication
on MICA2 takes 0.39ms [14] and consumes 0.0117mW [22].
Therefore, one exponentiation takes 0.09s and consumes
2.81mW. These results further can be improved by applying
fixed-base exponentiation and fixed-exponent exponentiation
algorithms, and finding the exact cost of squaring on MICA2
motes. For 160 bits ECC, the message size is 64 bytes plus
ρ (ρ is size of underlying signature). Using second IBOOS
[31] requires two point multiplications in offline phase, while
only integer addition and multiplication operations (which
are very efficient for sensor nodes in terms of time and
energy consumption) in the online phase. Therefore, the time
and energy cost of the online phase is almost negligible. For
160-bit ECC, the signature size is 60 bytes. Table 1 shows
that the proposed sensor broadcast scheme using IBOOS
schemes consume less energy and time in broadcasting a
message as compared to applying existing authentication
schemes to the sensor nodes.
In user authentication schemes, two existing schemes
provide distributed user authentication, RRUASN [3] and
DP2AC [32]. In RRUASN, authentication by sensor nodes
involves verification of two ECDSA signatures as expensive
operations. DP2AC involves one RSA signature verification
Table II
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED USER AUTHENTICATION SCHEME WITH
EXISTING USER AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES.
Schemes
Signature
Scheme
Energy
Cost (mWs)
Verification
Time (s)
Storage
Overhead
Session
Key
Existing Distributed User Authentication Schemes
RRUASN [3] ECDSA 106.84 3.54 0 No
DP2AC [32] RSA 14.05 + TE 0.47 + TT 10T bytes No
Proposed Distributed User Authentication Scheme
Proposed IBS [6] 72.90 2.43s 0 Yes
and verification of token reusability. An issue with this
scheme is the communication overhead per user request and
storage overhead. Every used token is stored on more than
one sensor nodes in the network. Assuming a token size =
10 bytes and number of used token T =10,000, the overall
storage overhead will be 100,000 bytes which is considerable
for resource constrained sensor nodes. Verification cost
involves energy and time costs to verify RSA signature plus
transmission energy (T E) and transmission time (T T ) costs
of sending a token to a set of sensor nodes for reusability
checking. The proposed outside user authentication scheme
based on IBS [6] involves one signature verification consist-
ing of three point multiplications by the sensor nodes during
the authentication phase. Table 2 shows that the proposed
user authentication scheme consumes less energy and time
as compared to RRUASN and eliminates the storage and
communication overhead of DP2AC. It also provides session
key establishment.
D. Impact of Applying PKC on Sensor Nodes
Application of PKC operations on sensor nodes does not
affect node’s life time drastically, if the number of public key
operations is smaller or spread over time [22]. Broadcast of
a message by a sensor node is not a very frequent event in
considered applications. For example, in case of a fire alarm
application, a message is sent by the sensor node only when
a fire is set up anywhere. Signing a message occasionally,
only in critical situations, is not very expensive for sensor
nodes. With 2AA batteries in ordinary MICA sensor motes,
the available energy is 6750,000mWs [22]. If only 2% of this
energy i.e., 135,000mWs, is available for signing broadcast
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messages, a sensor mote can sign 24,021 messages applying
first IBOOS scheme and 2,778 messages applying second
IBOOS scheme during the life time of the batteries. This
number of broadcast messages is big enough for the above
mentioned applications. With the same available energy,
a sensor node can sign 1,550 messages in IDS scheme
and 1,852 messages in IMBAS scheme which shows that
our proposed sensor broadcast authentication scheme gives
better results than applying existing broadcast authentication
schemes to the sensor nodes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The main contribution of this research work is an au-
thentication framework which provides two features; quick
authenticated broadcast by sensor nodes and user authentica-
tion. Existing broadcast authentication schemes in WSNs do
not handle the problem of authenticated broadcast by sen-
sor nodes. The proposed ID-based Online/Offline Signature
(IBOOS) based broadcast authentication scheme is an attrac-
tive solution to this problem. An ID-based Signature (IBS)
based distributed user authentication scheme is proposed to
authenticate outside users. Session keys secure the further
communication between the users and the sensor nodes. The
main advantage of this framework is its re-usability, that is,
it can also be reused with new IBS and IBOOS schemes for
security and performance improvements. In the future, we
intend to focus on user access control to provide a complete
ID-based authentication framework which would enable the
sensor nodes, on one hand, to broadcast a message to quickly
respond to some critical situations and, on the other hand,
to control user access according to his access privileges. We
are on the way to implement the proposed framework on
real sensor nodes to get actual results.
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